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This study analyzes the cause of the slowdown in Japan’s TFP growth during the 1990s. Many 
preceding studies, examining the issue at the macro- or industry-level, have found that the slowdown 
was primarily due to the stagnation in TFP growth in the manufacturing sector. Using establishment 
level panel data covering the entire sector, we investigate the causes of the TFP slowdown and find 
that the reallocation of resources from less efficient to more efficient firms was very slow and 
limited. This “low metabolism” seems to be an important reason for the slowdown in Japan’s TFP 
growth. 
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1. Introduction 
In the 1990s, Japan experienced a significant slowdown in the growth of total factor 
productivity (TFP) – a trend that stands in stark contrast with many other advanced countries. A 
number of empirical studies have examined the causes of this slowdown in TFP growth by focusing 
on the micro level.
1  Although these studies have thrown light on some aspects of Japan’s economic 
malaise, few studies showed how much of the TFP slowdown at the macro level can be explained by 
the diseases they diagnosed.   
In the case of the United States, Canada, and the EU countries, there has been a dramatic 
increase in the number of productivity studies using longitudinal micro-level data sets. In the EU 
KLEMS project, for example, Eric J. Bartelsman and other scholars are trying to link their results on 
productivity at the micro-level with sector- and macro-level results on productivity. Japan, however, 
probably because of the lack of appropriate data sets, has been relatively left behind in such studies, 
which link micro-level productivity analyses with sector- or macro-level productivity analyses. 
In order to fill this gap, the research project “Study on Industry-Level and Firm-Level 
Productivity in Japan” at the RIETI (Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry) has been 
compiling a sector- and micro-level database with, in the case of sector-level data, covers the whole 
economy or at least, in the case of micro-level data, a substantial part of the Japanese economy. The 
sector-level data set is called the Japan Industrial Productivity (JIP) Database.
2 
Using the JIP 2006 Database and establishment-level data of the Census of Manufactures 
                                                        
1 See Fukao and Kwon (2006) for overview of empirical studies on Japan’s TFP growth rate of the 
1990s at the macro- and the sector-level. 
2 The original version of the JIP Database (ESRI/Hi-Stat JIP Database 2003) was compiled in a 
collaboration between ESRI (Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office, Government 
of Japan) as part of its research project on “Japan’s Potential Growth” and Hitotsubashi University as 
part of its Hi-Stat project (A 21st-Century COE Program, Research Unit for Statistical Analysis in 
the Social Sciences).   2
compiled by this project, this paper investigates the causes of the stagnation of productivity in Japan. 
In this paper we first show that productivity slowdown mainly occurred in Japan’s 
manufacturing sector. Next, we decompose the aggregate productivity growth of Japan’s 
manufacturing sector into a within effect, a reallocation effect, and a net entry effect. Although 
Nishimura, Nakajima and Kiyota (2005), Fukao Kwon (2004, 2006) and Ahn, Fukao and Kwon 
(2004) already conducted productivity decompositions, using the firm-level data of the Ministry of 
Economy, International Trade and Industry’s Kigyo Katsudo Kihon Chosa (Basic Survey on Business 
Activities by Enterprises), these studies do not allow an examination of the causes of Japan’s 
productivity slowdown because the Basic Survey only covers the period after 1992.   
In this paper, we assess changes in productivity dynamics at the sector- and the micro-level from 
the 1980s to 2003 using the JIP 2006 Database and the establishment-level data of the Census of 
Manufactures. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first study that compares Japanese 
micro-level productivity dynamics in the 1990s with those of the 1980s.   
Our analysis suggests that the decline in aggregate productivity growth was not due to a decline 
in the reallocation effect but due to (a) a slowdown in TFP growth within establishments; and (b) a 
worsening negative exit effect, meaning that closures of productive establishments were more 
frequent than closures of unproductive establishments.   
Finally, we examine why the negative exit effects have worsened and productivity growth within 
each establishment has drastically declined since the collapse of the bubble economy. We found 
some evidence supporting the hollowing-out hypothesis, namely, that productive establishments 
seem to be closed down and production relocated abroad. We also found that the slowdown in 
productivity growth within existing establishments is partly caused by the low start-up rate and the 
high closure rate during the lost decade.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In the next section, using the JIP 2006   3
database, we present an overview of Japan’s TFP growth from 1970 to 2002. In Section 3, we conduct 
a decomposition of TFP growth in the manufacturing sector and compare our results with preceding 
studies on other developed economies. In Section 4, we examine TFP dynamics and entry and exit at 
establishment level. Finally, in Section 5, we summarize our results and discuss the policy 
implications of our findings. 
 
2. An Evidence of Japan’s Macro and Sectoral TFP Growth from 1970 to 2002 
Since the early 1990s, Japan has suffered a large decline in aggregate productivity growth 
when compared to the relatively rapid growth in the 1980s (Hayashi and Prescott 2001, Fukao et al. 
2004).
3 Sector-level analysis shows that the decrease in productivity growth can be seen across the 
board sector (Fukao et al. 2004, Fukao and Kwon 2006). In addition, previous studies have shown 
that the slowdown in TFP growth was more severe in the manufacturing sector than in the 
non-manufacturing sector. From an international perspective, Japan’s productivity growth over the 
past decade or so has been extraordinarily low, and in contrast with Japan, many countries enjoyed 
significant improvements in productivity as a result of the ICT revolution in the 1990s.   
In this section, we provide a detailed examination of the reasons for the slowdown in Japan’s 
productivity growth during the 1990s using growth accounting. We will use aggregate and sectoral 
data from the JIP 2006 database developed by Fukao et al. (2006).
4  
                                                        
3  It should be noted, however, that there are also several studies that came to the conclusion that the 
slowdown in the TFP growth in the 1990s was not that large. See, e.g., Jorgenson and Motohashi 
(2004) and Kawamoto (2004). 
4 The JIP 2006 Database was compiled as part of a RIETI research project. The detailed results of 
this project are reported in Fukao et al. (2006). The database contains annual information on 108 
sectors, including 56 non-manufacturing sectors, from 1970 to 2002. These sectors cover the whole 
Japanese economy. The database includes detailed information on factor inputs, annual nominal and 
real input-output tables, as well as some additional statistics, such as capacity utilization rates,   4
Table 2.1 summarizes the result of the macro-level growth accounting. In our growth 
accounting exercise, we divided the period 1970-2002 into five-year intervals and into three long 
subperiods. We included the three long subperiods because growth accounting for shorter periods 
tends to be more strongly affected by cyclical variations in productivity growth. According to our 
calculations based on data from the JIP database, real GDP growth, which we calculated using a 
Laspeyres chain index, declined from 4.41 percent in 1980-1990 to 1.10 percent in 1990-2002.
5 
This decline of 3.31 percentage-points can be decomposed into the following factors: 
–  a decline in man-hour growth of 0.86 percentage points; 
–  a decline in labor quality growth of 0.08 percentage points; 
–  a decline in capital stock growth of 0.82 percentage points; 
–  a decline in capital quality growth of 0.40 percentage points; 
–  a decline in TFP growth of 1.17 percentage points.   
 
As this list shows, all factors contributed to the decline in economic growth during Japan’s 
lost decade. The decline in TFP growth rate is smaller than the results of Hayashi and Prescott (2002) 
and Yoshikawa and Matsumoto (2001), suggesting that the TFP growth rate at the macro-level 
declined by more than 2 percentage points from the 1980s to the 1990s. Our results also show that the 
most important factor underlying the stagnation during the 1990s is the decline in TFP growth. But 
what is also remarkable is the large drop in the growth contribution of capital. In fact, the slowdown 
in capital deepening – i.e., the contribution of the change in capital stock and capital quality taken 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Japan’s international trade by trade partner, inward and outward FDI, etc., at the detailed sectoral 
level. An Excel file version of the JIP2006 Database is available on RIETI’s web site. 
5 As Fukao and Kwon (2006) indicate, the fixed-weighted Laspeyres price index for ICT products 
suffers from bias because the outputs share of ICT products, which registered faster price declines, 
increased.      5
together – was even more severe than the decline in TFP growth. These results indicate that the 
stagnation of Japan’s economy has been caused by both supply-side and demand-side factors.   
Insert Table 2.1 
Table 2.2 compares the growth accounting results for the manufacturing and the 
non-manufacturing sector. The results indicate that real output growth and man-hour growth slowed 
much more significantly in the manufacturing than in the non-manufacturing sector. On the other 
hand, the growth contribution of capital in the non-manufacturing sector, which had been substantial 
in the 1970s and 1980s, fell markedly during the 1990s. Finally, like many previous studies, we 
found that the slowdown in TFP growth was more severe in the manufacturing than in the 
non-manufacturing sector.  
Looking at the estimates for the five-year intervals, we find that all growth indicators – real 
GDP, man-hours, capital stock, and TFP – saw a remarkable drop immediately after the collapse of 
the bubble economy. TFP growth, capital deepening, and labor supply all saw a much more 
pronounced deceleration than in previous business cycles. Following the collapse of bubble economy, 
Japan’s economy failed to rebound quickly and TFP growth and capital deepening stopped.   
Considerable differences in productivity growth across industries can be observed and it is 
quite possible that a few industries account for most of the productivity growth at the macro level. 
We therefore examined the contribution of individual sectors to macro-level productivity growth and 
the results are illustrated in Figures 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3. Figure 2.3 shows that during the “lost decade” 
of the 1990s, the wholesale sector accounts for all the productivity growth in the economy as a 
whole. In contrast, during the preceding decade, productivity growth in the economy as a whole was 
supported by eleven sectors. The aggregate productivity acceleration in 1980s was supported by 
eleven sectors, led by the wholesale, finance, retail, and civil engineering sectors due their relative 
size (Figure 2.2). In the 1970s, six sectors accounted for 95 percent of total productivity growth.   6
These sectors included the motor vehicle parts and accessories, electronic parts, household electric 
appliances, and motor vehicles sectors, which registered the highest rates of productivity growth 
during this period. 
The rank of leading industry has remained fairly stable over the decades. The top five 
industries in the 1970s were: wholesale, retail, motor vehicle parts and accessories, electronic parts, 
and household electric appliances. In the 1980s, the order was as follows: wholesale, finance, retail, 
civil engineering, and electronic data processing machines. Finally, in the 1990s, the list was again 
topped by wholesale, followed by public administration, electronic parts, finance, and electronic data 
processing machines.   
Comparing the top ten contributing sectors in Japan and the United States, we find that these 
are fairly similar.
6 Two sectors, wholesale and electronic parts, are among the top ten in the two 
countries in all periods. Overall, the two major industries making the greatest contribution to 
aggregate productivity growth both in Japan and the United States and throughout the entire period 
were the commerce and the electrical machinery/electronics sector.   
During lost decade, all industries experienced decline of productivity growth, and sector with 
strong productivity growth could not maintain their acceleration of productivity. There was good 
news such as five of the top ten contributing industries to productivity growth hailed from the 
service sector, such as “telegraph and telephone,” “finance” and “information services and 
internet-based services.” The above results indicate that for Japan’s economy to once again achieve 
sustained rates of growth, the emergence of new growth sectors and an acceleration of productivity 
growth in the service sector are indispensable. 
 
 
                                                        
6  See Farrell, Baily and Remes (2005) for case of United States.   7
3. Decomposition of Total Factor and Labor Productivity Growth in the Manufacturing Sector 
by Industry   
As Baily, Hulten and Campbell (1992) and Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (1998) have shown 
in their productivity decomposition analyses, the start-up of productive establishments and the closure 
of unproductive establishments substantially contributed to TFP growth in the United States. Figure 
3.1 shows that, in the 1980s, the start-up rate (the number of newly set up establishments divided by 
the number of all establishments) and the closure rate in Japan were only about half of the 
corresponding values for the U.S. Moreover, the gap widened in the 1990s as the start-up rate in 
Japan’s manufacturing sector declined to only about 2%. This factor is likely to have contributed to the 
slowdown in TFP growth in Japan’s manufacturing sector. We examine this crucial issue in this 
section.  
Insert Figure 3.1 
We use a longitudinal database on Japanese manufacturing establishments for the period 
1981-2003. The establishment-level data are taken from the Kogyo Tokei Chosa ( Census of 
Manufactures), which is conducted annually by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 
(METI).
7 We created this longitudinal database making use of work of the “Quantitative Analysis 
Database Group” at RIETI on the linkage of establishment identification numbers over time.
8  
The census covers all Japanese manufacturing establishments except those belonging to the 
government as well as head offices not directly engaged in the manufacturing, processing or repair 
of industrial products. The census covers all establishments in years ending with 0, 3, 5 and 8 of the 
Western calendar year. In the other years, the Census covers establishments with four or more 
                                                        
7 The compilation of the microdata of the Census of Manufactures was conducted as part of the 
RIETI project “Study on Industry- and Firm-Level Productivity in Japan.” 
8  This group at RIETI includes Kazunari Shinbo, Mutsuharu Takahashi, Hyeog Ug Kwon, Toshiyuki 
Matsuura and others. For details on this linkage process, see Shinbo, Takahashi and Omori (2005).   8
employees. In the case of censuses covering all establishments, data on establishments with less than 
four employees until a few years ago used to be managed and stored by prefectural governments. 
Most of these data appear to already have been discarded and therefore were not available to us.
9 
For this reason, we had to confine our analysis to establishments with four or more employees. It is 
important to note that in this study, our data on establishments that “closed” include establishments 
which shrunk to a size of less than four employees or changed their main business from the 
manufacturing sector to another sector.   
There are 9,049,011 establishment observations for the period of 1981-2003. Out of these 9 
million observations, we can calculate the labor productivity (real value added per man-hour) for 
about 8,852,575 observations and TFP for about 3,485,030 observations. Many small establishments 
did not provide information regarding key variables, such as capital stock, which are indispensable 
for our calculation of TFP. We treated establishments that failed to provide such information in one 
year as ongoing establishments, not as closed establishments, but we did not include these 
establishments in our calculation of industry-level TFP growth. This, however, means that our 
decomposition analysis of TFP growth at the industry level might be biased as a large number of 
small firms are not included. In order to examine whether our TFP growth estimates are biased and 
to correct for this problem, we also decompose labor productivity by industry. 
We divide the manufacturing establishments into 48 industries and calculate the relative TFP 
and labor productivity of each establishment in relation to the industry average. Following Good, 
Nadiri, and Sickles (1997) and Aw, Chen, and Roberts (1997), we define the TFP level of 
establishment  f in year t in a certain industry in comparison with the TFP level of a hypothetical 
representative establishment in year 0 in that industry by 
                                                        
9  For more on this issue, see Shimizu and Miyagawa (2003).   9
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where Qf, t, Si, f, t, and Xi, f, t denote the gross output of establishment f in year t, the cost share of factor 
i for establishment f in year t, and establishment f’s input of factor i in year t, respectively. Variables 
with an upper bar denote the industry average of that variable. We use 1981 as the base year 0. We 
assume constant returns to scale. As factor inputs, we take account of capital, labor and real 
intermediate inputs.   
We define the representative establishment for each industry as a hypothetical establishment 
whose gross output as well as input and cost share of all production factors are identical with the 
industry average. The first two terms on the right hand side of equation (3.1) denote the gap between 
establishment f’s TFP level in year t and the representative establishment’s TFP level in that year. The 
third and fourth term denote the gap between the representative establishment’s TFP level in year t and 
the representative establishment’s TFP level in year 0. Therefore, lnTFPf, t in equation (3.1) denotes 
the gap between establishment f’s TFP level in year t and the representative establishment’s TFP level 
in year 0.  
In a similar way, we define the labor productivity level of establishment f in year t in a certain 
industry in comparison with the labor productivity level of a hypothetical representative establishment 
in year 0 in that industry by 
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where Yf, t, and Li, f, t denote the real value added (real gross output minus real intermediate input) of 
establishment f in year t and establishment f’s labor input in year t, respectively. 
For details on the definition of and data source for each variable, please see Appendix A.   10
Because of data limitations, we cannot take account of the change in labor quality in our productivity 
analysis. It is probably for this reason that we arrive at a higher TFP growth estimate than the 
industry-level result based on the JIP 2006 in the previous section. We also assume that the working 
hours at each establishment are equal to the industry average. 
Adopting the methodology used by Baily, Hulten and Campbell (1992) and Foster, Haltiwanger 
and Krizan (1998), we define the industry-level TFP of a certain industry in year t by 
t f F f t f t TFP TFP , , ln ln ∑ ∈ = θ  (3.2) 
where θf, t denotes establishment f’s sales share in year t in that industry. F is the set of all the 
establishments existed at least either in year t-τ or in year t in this industry. Then, as Foster, 
Haltiwanger and Krizan (1998) showed, we can decompose the manufacturing sector’s TFP growth 
from year t-τ to year t, lnTFP t – lnTFP t-τ, into the following five factors.   
Within effect:  t f S f t f TFP , , ln Δ ∑ ∈ −τ θ  
Between effect:  ) ln (ln , , τ τ θ − − ∈ − Δ ∑ t t f S f t f TFP TFP  
Covariance effect:  t f S f t f TFP , , ln Δ Δ ∑ ∈ θ  
Entry effect:  ) ln (ln , , τ θ − ∈ − ∑ t t f N f t f TFP TFP  
Exit effect:  ) ln ln ( , , τ τ τ θ − − ∈ − − ∑ t f t X f t f TFP TFP  
where S is the set of establishments that stayed in that industry from year t-τ to year t, N is the set of 
establishments that newly entered and X is the set of establishments that exited. TFP with an upper 
bar denotes the industry-average TFP level.   
In a similar way, we define the industry-level labor productivity of a certain industry in year t as 
t f F f t f t LP LP , , ln ln ∑ ∈ = λ  (3.2) 
where  λf,  t denotes establishment f’s labor input share in that industry in year t. Then we can   11
decompose labor productivity growth in the manufacturing sector from year t-τ to year t, lnLP t – 
lnLP t-τ, into the following five factors.
  
Within effect:  t f S f t f LP , , ln Δ ∑ ∈ −τ λ  
Between effect:  ) ln (ln , , τ τ λ − − ∈ − Δ ∑ t t f S f t f LP LP  
Covariance effect:  t f S f t f LP , , ln Δ Δ ∑ ∈ λ  
Entry effect:  ) ln (ln , , τ λ − ∈ − ∑ t t f N f t f LP LP  
Exit effect:  ) ln ln ( , , τ τ τ λ − − ∈ − − ∑ t f t X f t f LP LP  
where S is the set of establishments that stayed in that industry from year t-τ to year t, N is the set of 
establishments that newly entered and X is the set of establishments that exited. LP with an upper bar 
denotes the industry-average labor productivity level. 
The results of our decomposition for the period from 1981 to 2003 are reported in Table 3.3 and 
Figures 3.2 and 3.3. We divided the whole period into five sub-periods: 1981-85, 85-90, 90-95, 
95-2000, and 2000-2003. The switch-in and switch-out effects in Table 3.1 and Figures 3.2 and 3.3 
show the contribution of those establishments that moved from one industry to another to the industry 
average of the total factor and labor productivity level. It has been pointed out in preceding studies 
that decomposition results are affected by business cycles.
10 Figure 3.4 shows capacity utilization 
rate and diffusion index of business conditions. In order to minimize the impact of business cycles on 
our estimation, we also decompose growth rates for the longer time spans of 1981-1990 and 
                                                        
10  In 1981-2002, there were four official business cycle peaks, June 1985, February 1991, May 1997, 
and November 2000, and five troughs, February 1983, November 1986, October 1993, January 1999, 
and January 2002. Official peak and trough dates are available in Business Cycle Reference Dates, 
Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office, Government of Japan 
(<http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/>).   12
1990-2003. The results are also reported in Table 3.2. 
Insert Tables 3.1 and 3.2 and Figures 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 
 
Our most important findings can be summarized as follows 
 
1.  The final column of Table 3.1 reports the exit effect (including the switch-out effect). The 
contribution of exit effect in whole periods was negative, irrespective of productivity indexes. 
What is more, the negative exit effect has been steadily growing. The negative exit effect means 
that the productivity level of exiting establishments has been higher than the industry average. We 
also found that exit effect was negative for all industries. Fukao and Kwon (2006) also found 
similar negative exit effects using firm-level data in the 1990s. 
2.  The entry effect (including switch-in effect) was both positive and has tended to increase (Table 
3.1). The entry effect was positive in almost all the industries. Contrary to exit of establishments, 
the entry of new establishments contributes to raise industry productivity growth.
11 
3.   Moreover, the net entry effect has been positive in all periods. The entry and exit process tends to 
raise productivity growth as the entry of high productivity establishments has exceeds exit of high 
productivity. The net contribution to overall productivity growth of the entry and exit of 
establishments is small and has declined over time. In the long-term, contribution of net entry 
effect to productivity growth is stable but gradually decreasing. It is noteworthy that the Japanese 
economy has experienced the decline of the contribution of plant turnover to productivity growth 
in the 1990s. 
                                                        
11Because of five and ten year interval, we observe as entry establishements not start-up 
establishments but 2 years over establishments. Therefore, in case of annual data, our entry effect is 
calculated as the productivity growth of surviving establishments.   13
4.  The within effect, i.e. the effect of TFP growth within staying establishments, made the largest 
contribution to overall productivity growth in all periods (Table 3.1). However, this effect saw a 
sharp drop in the 1990s. The decline in the within effect is primarily attributable to the slowdown 
in productivity growth in the manufacturing sector.   
5.  The reallocation effect, which is the sum of the between effect and the covariance effect, 
contributed about half of the total productivity growth in the 1990s (in the case of TFP growth). 
This indicates that market forces have played an important role in efficiently allocating resources 
away from establishments that perform poorly and to establishments that perform well. In 
particular, the covariance effect, which gives the contribution of surviving establishments with 
increasing shares and growing productivity, seems to have been more important in the 1990s. This 
indicates that, instead of low net entry effect, the reallocation effect across existing establishments 
plays a stronger role to promote productivity growth in the 1990s (Table 3.1). The reallocation 
effect is interpreted as reflecting the creative destruction processes (Bartelsman et al, 2004). The 
creative destruction within existing establishments in Japan’s 1990s was very important factor to 
support aggregate productivity. In this context, it is encouraging that the Japanese government is 
trying to further strengthen the role of market forces through structural reforms.     
 
In order to put Japan’s productivity performance into international perspective, we compare 
our results of those with studies for the U.S., Canada, the U.K., and South Korea. However, it should 
be borne in mind that such a comparison presents various problems as the studies use different data 
sets, weights, and time spans. Below, we compare our results with those of studies for the countries 
mentioned that use the same methodology, although the time periods differ:   
 
1.   In recessionary periods, the reallocation effect rather than the within effect dominates. In contrast,   14
during boom periods, it is the within effect that dominates. In Japan, however, share of within 
effect do not change even in great depression, although the growth of within effect drastically 
dropped.  
2.   In all periods and all countries, the net entry effect is positive, suggesting that productivity grows 
as less productive establishments exit and more productive ones enter In addition, we find that in 
almost all countries except Japan, the net entry effect is the major source of overall productivity 
growth during recessionary periods. Yet, although Japan’s recession lasted longer than those in 
other countries, we find that the contribution of the net entry effect is smallest, indicating that the 
mechanism of “creative destruction” in Japan’s manufacturing sector is very weak. 
3.   The redistribution of market shares among incumbents, whereby high productivity establishments 
increase market shares and relatively low productivity decrease them, contributes positively to 
aggregate productivity growth in all periods and countries. Overall, the productivity dynamics-sum 
of reallocation effect and net entry effect is larger than the within effect in all countries except 
Japan. This means that productivity growth due to market selection is essential to boost aggregate 
productivity growth. In Japan, productivity dynamics positively contributed to aggregate 
productivity growth, but the effect was smaller than that of other countries. This “low metabolism” 
seems to have slowed down the TFP growth of the manufacturing sector. 
 
To sum up the above results, we find that the decline in Japan’s TFP growth in 1990s is largely 
due to the drop in the within effect. Conversely, the share of the reallocation effect has grown due to 
a strengthening of the role of the market. Yet, while the above analysis allowed us to determine the 
relative contribution of the within and the reallocation effect, it tell us little about why the within 
effect declined and why the negative exit effect enlarged. 
   15
4. Analysis of Causes of Negative Exit Effects and Sharp Decline in Within Effects   
As shown in the previous section, the decline in Japan’s TFP and labor productivity growth in 
the 1990s and the early 2000s was not caused by a slowdown of the “metabolism,” i.e., the 
reallocation effect. Rather, it was primarily caused by a decline in the within effect. That is, in the 
period since 1990, it was the TFP and labor productivity growth within establishments that slowed 
down. We also showed that the absolute size of the negative exit effect became larger in the 1990s 
and the early 2000s. On a brighter note, we found that the positive entry effect increased during the 
period from 2000 to 2003. In order to understand how these changes in the 1990s and early 2000s 
came about, in this section we investigate the productivity dynamics and the entry and exit of 
establishments in greater detail. 
Panel A of Figure 4.1 shows the share of establishments that were newly opened or closed in 
the total number of establishments.
12  Panel B shows the share accounted for by such establishments 
in total manufacturing output. These two figures show that the closure rate has been growing almost 
continuously since the beginning of the 1990s. On the other hand, the start-up rate declined in the 
1990s, but then recovered during 2000-2003. The share of start-up establishments in total output did 
not decline in the 1990s because larger establishments were opened in this period than in the 1980s. 
Insert Figure 4.1 
Many establishments could not survive in the period 1990-2003. We can confirm this by 
                                                        
12 As we already explained in the previous section, the Census covers all establishments in years 
ending with 0, 3, 5 and 8 of the Western calendar year. For other years, the Census covers 
establishments with four or more employees. In years when the Census covers only establishments 
with four or more employees, some establishments with more than four employees report that they 
employ less than four in order to evade the obligation to fill in the questionnaire. Because of such 
behavior, the number of establishments and our figures on “start-ups” tend to become higher in years 
when the Census covers all establishments. For more on this issue, see Shimizu and Miyagawa 
(2003).   16
looking at transition matrices of establishments' rank in labor productivity (Table 4.2). Only 44% of 
all the establishments which existed in 1990 survived until 2003 (the average annual survival rate 
was 93.8%). In contrast, from 1981 to 1990, 65% establishments continued to operate (the annual 
survival rate was 95.4%). In the 1990-2003 period, 239,482 establishments were closed and only 
101,152 establishments were opened. As a result, the number of establishments declined by 33% 
from 424,535 to 286,205. In the 1980-1990 period, the number of closures and the number of 
start-ups were more or less in balance and the number of establishments actually increased slightly. 
Insert Table 4.2 
Table 4.2 also shows that the degree of persistence of labor productivity is very high. 56% of 
establishments which originally ranked in the bottom three deciles in 1990 remained in the same 
three deciles in 2003. Similarly, 55% of establishments which originally ranked in the top three 
deciles in 1990 remained in the same three deciles in 2003 (if they survived). We also found a 
similar persistence of productivity in the case of TFP.
13 
It is important to note that the survival rate is not high even in the case of establishments in the 
top labor-productivity group. From 1990 to 2003, only 47% of establishments in this group survived. 
The survival rates of establishments in the higher labor productivity groups are slightly greater than 
those of establishments in the lower labor productivity groups. But the average size of 
establishments in the higher labor productivity groups is larger than in the lower labor productivity 
groups. These factors cause the negative exit effect that can be seen in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3.
14 
As these figures show, the negative exit effect worsened after 1995.   
                                                        
13  Several studies examining plant level TFP found the degree of persistence to be also very high in 
the U.S. manufacturing sector (Baily et al., 1992; Bartelsman and Doms, 2000). Fukao and Kwon 
(2006) found a similar high persistence in firm-level TFP in Japan’s manufacturing sector. 
14  Using firm-level TFP data for Japan’s manufacturing sector for the period after 1994, Nishimura, 
Nakajima and Kiyota (2005) and Fukao and Kwon (2006) found similar negative exit effects.   17
Why did the negative exit effect worsen after 1995? One possible explanation is a 
hollowing-out effect as a result of direct investment abroad. In the 1990s, Japanese firms relocated 
production to Asian countries (primarily the ASEAN countries and China) in order to lower 
production costs. As Figure 4.2 shows, in the case of the electrical machinery industry, there was 
indeed a very rapid increase in production abroad and a decline in domestic production and net 
exports in the period 1990-2003. Since it is mainly productive large firms that invest abroad, this 
relocation of production may have led to the closure of productive establishments in Japan.   
 
Insert Figure 4.2 
If we can link our establishment data with firm-level data of direct investment abroad, we 
could test the above hypothesis. Unfortunately, we do not have such linked micro data at this 
moment. But at the industry level, we can test our hypothesis. Figure 4.3 compares changes in 
Japanese firms’ production in East Asia (China, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Thailand, the 
Philippines, and Malaysia) from 1990 to 2002 with the exit effect in 1990-2003. We have 48 cross 
industry observations. Consistent with our hypothesis, we can observe a negative correlation 
between production in Asia and the exit effect. The correlation coefficient is 0.42, which is 
statistically significant at the 5% level. When we exclude observations for the communication 
equipment industry, which seems to strongly contribute to the negative correlation, the correlation 
coefficient declines to 0.24 but is still significant at the 5% level.   
Insert Figure 4.3 
Based on a different approach but using similar longitudinal labor productivity data on 
manufacturing establishments (for the period 1985-95) , Shimizu and Miyagawa (2003) found that in 
many industries, such as the mechanical rubber products and household electric appliances industries, 
the labor productivity of establishments that closed was significantly higher than that of   18
establishments that stayed. Although they focused on an earlier period than ours, they arrived at 
similar inferences as we did, that is, the closure of productive establishments may be caused by the 
relocation of production from Japan to foreign countries.   
Although we need linked micro data in order to draw conclusions about the cause of the 
worsening negative exit effect, the hollowing-out hypothesis seems to be a leading hypothesis.   
Next, let us analyze about the slowdown of within effects in Japan’s manufacturing from the 
1990s. In order to completely understand the trend of within effect, we need firm level data such as, 
R&D, IT investment at head office, M&A, international trade and out-sourcing etc. At this moment 
we do not have such data. But using the data we have, we can analyze how sharp decline of number 
of establishments contributed the slow-down of within effects. 
According to proceeding studies, new establishments gradually expand their size and improve 
their productivity overtime (Baldwin 1998, Bartelsman and Doms 2000). And exiting firms have 
lower performance several years before their exit (Kiyota and Takizawa 2006). In our decomposition 
analysis some part of such learning effects and shadow-of-death effects might be included in our 
within effect. For example, suppose one establishment is opened in 1983 and gradually improved 
their productivity from 1983 to 1990. If the productivity level of this establishment has already 
become high by 1985, this fact is counted as positive entry effect for the period of 1980-1985. But 
their productivity improvement after 1985 is counted as within effect for the period of 1985-1990. In 
a similar way some part of shadow-of-death effect might be included in within effect.   
As a result of low open-up rate and high closure rate in the 1990s, the output share of 
establishments set up in the previous six years has declined from 1988 to 1995 (Panel A of Figure 
4.4) and the share of establishments closing in the next ten years has drastically increased from 1985 
to 1993 (Panel B of Figure 4.4). These changes of age structure of manufacturing establishments 
might have reduced within effect.     19
Insert Figure 4.4 
Using our data, we evaluate magnitude of learning effects and shadow-of-death effects in 
Japan’s manufacturing. First, we estimate how quickly young establishments improve their 
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where an age dummy variable D
Lm
f,T takes value one if the establishment f belongs to a firm 
operating multiple establishments (we call such an establishment as multi-plant establishment) and is 
started up in T years ago. Otherwise D
Lm
f,T takes value zero. D
Ls
f,T takes value one if the 
establishment  f belongs to a firm not operating multiple establishments (we call such an 
establishment as single-plant establishment) and is started up in T years ago. Otherwise D
Ls
f,T takes 
value zero. The set of D
L
f,t demote year dummies and the set of D
L
t,year denote industry dummies. 
TFPt, f
 * denotes a gap between establishment f’s TFP level and simple average TFP level of that 
industry in year t; 
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Since we found large differences of both TFP level and learning effects between single-plant 
establishment and multi-plant establishment, we assumed different age coefficient between the two 
groups.  
If we include establishments closed later within our sample, our age coefficients pick up not 
only learning effects but also selection effects; the effects caused by closure of establishments. As 
Table 4-3 shows, there is a severe selection process. Less than 50% of newly opened establishments 
can survive in the next 10 years. In order to exclude selection effects, we exclude establishments 
closed before 2003 from our observations for estimation. In the case of establishments set up before   20
1981, we do not know their age and all the age dummies take value zero. Such establishments plus 
establishments older than 16 years are the base group for the estimation. The data is pooled and we 
used OLS regression.   
Insert Table 4.3 
Figure 4.5 shows estimated learning effect. Vertical line segments denote 5% confidence 
intervals. Multi-plant establishments and single-plant establishments have similar level of TFP in the 
open-up year. But multi-plant establishments more quickly improve their productivity after the 
open-up.  
Insert Figure 4.5 
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  (4.2) 
where an closure year dummy variable D
Cm
f,T takes value one if the establishment f is a multi-plant 
establishment and is closed in T years later. Otherwise D
Cm
f,T takes value zero. D
Cs
f,T takes value one 
if the establishment f is a single-plant and is closed T years later. We exclude establishments, which 
entered after 1982 and survived until 2003, from our observations for estimation since we do not 
know whether they can survive for more than 21 years. Establishments which survived for more than 
21 years are the base group for the estimation. 
Figure 4.6 shows estimated shadow-of-death effect. Vertical line segments denote 5% 
confidence intervals. Although the average TFP level of multi-plant establishments is much higher 
than that of single-plant establishments, they deteriorate before the closure in a similar way. We also 
calculated inter-temporal changes of ratio of the average plant size of establishments set up in the 
same year to the industry average plant size (Table 4.4) and inter-temporal changes of ratio of the   21
average plant size of establishments closed in the same year to the industry average plant size (Table 
4.5). These tables show that behind learning effects and shadow-of-death effects on TFP, size of 
establishments also sharply changes overtime.   
Insert Figure 4.6, Table 4.4 and 4.5 
We found substantial learning effects, which works for longer than five years after the open-up, 
and shadow-of-death effects, which works more than five years before the closure. We also found 
that as a result of low open-up rate and high closure rate in the 1990s, the output share of young 
establishments has declined and the share of establishments closing in the next ten years has 
drastically increased from the 1980s to the 1990s. Therefore it seems that we can explain the decline 
of within effects in the period of 1990-2003, at least partly, by the low open-up rate and high closure 
rate in the 1990s. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Using the JIP 2006 Database and establishment-level data of the Census of Manufactures, we 
examined why Japan’s TFP growth slowed down in the 1990s. The major results obtained through our 
analysis are follows: 
1.  Using JIP 2006 data, we examined Japan’s TFP growth decline at the macro and the sectoral 
level. Like previous studies, we found that the growth rate of TFP declined at the macro level 
and the slowdown in TFP growth was more severe in the manufacturing than in the 
non-manufacturing sector. 
2.  Our productivity decomposition analysis based on establishment-level data showed that the 
decline in aggregate productivity growth was not due to a decline in the reallocation effect but 
due to (a) a slowdown in TFP growth within establishments; and (b) a worsening negative exit 
effect, meaning that closures of productive establishments were more frequent than closures of   22
unproductive establishment. 
3.  In all periods and all countries, the net entry effect is positive, suggesting that productivity 
grows as less productive establishments exit and more productive ones enter In addition, we find 
that in almost all countries, the net entry effect is the major source of overall productivity growth 
during recessionary periods. Yet, although Japan’s recession lasted longer than those in other 
countries, we find that the contribution of the net entry effect is smallest, indicating that the 
mechanism of “creative destruction” in Japan’s manufacturing sector is very weak. However, on 
the bright side, the contribution of the entry effect has increased in recent years. 
4.  Transition matrices reveal a considerable persistence in the level of productivity. 56% of 
establishments which originally ranked in the bottom three deciles in 1990 remained in the same 
three deciles in 2003. Similarly, 55% of establishments which originally ranked in the top three 
deciles in 1990 remained in the same three deciles in 2003. However, the survival rate is not 
high even in the case of establishments in the top labor-productivity groups. 
5.  The average productivity of establishments that exited was higher than the average productivity 
in that industry. Probably, this is a consequence of the relocation of production from Japan to 
foreign countries.   
6.  Without doubt, most of the decline in productivity growth comes from the decrease in the within 
effect. It seems also certain that the decline in the within effect was caused by the low start-up 
rate and high closure rate during the 1990s. This implies that an active turnover in plants is 
essential to boost Japan’s aggregate productivity.   23
Appendix A. Definition of Variables Used in the Econometric Analysis and Data Sources 
The data source of this study is the Census of Manufactures, which is conducted annually by 
the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). The survey covers all manufacturing plants 
with four or more employees, and it excludes plants that ceased operating or whose employment fell 
below the survey’s threshold of four employees. It contains detailed information on plant 
characteristics, such as output, employees, intermediate inputs, tangible capital, location, etc. The 
available data cover the period 1981-2003. 
 
A1. Construction of variables to measure productivity   
Output: Gross output is measured as the sum of shipments, revenues from repairing and fixing 
services, and revenues from performing subcontracted work. Gross output is deflated by output 
deflators derived from the JIP 2006. Real value added is defined as real gross output minus real 
intermediate inputs. 
 
Intermediate inputs: Intermediate inputs are defined as the sum of raw materials, fuel, electricity 
and subcontracting expenses for consigned production used by the plant. Intermediate inputs are 
deflated by intermediate input deflators provided in the JIP 2006.   
 
Labor input: As labor input, we used each firm’s total number of workers multiplied by the sectoral 
working hours from the JIP 2006. 
 
Capital Stock: Using the nominal book values of tangible fixed assets including buildings, 
machinery, tools and transport equipment, we calculated the net capital stock of plant i in industry j 
in constant 1995 prices as follows:   24
) / ( jt jt it it IBV INK BV K ∗ =  
where BVit represents the book value of firm i’s tangible fixed capital in year t, INKjt stands for the 
net capital stock of industry j in constant 1995 prices, and IBVjt denotes the book value of industry 
j’s capital. INKjt is calculated as follows. First, as a benchmark, we took the data on the book value 
of tangible fixed assets in 1976 from the Census of Manufactures 1976 published by METI. We then 
converted the book value of year 1976 into the real value in constant 1995 prices using the net fixed 
assets deflator provided in the Annual Report on National Accounts published by the Cabinet Office, 
Government of Japan. Second, the net capital stock of industry j, INKjt, for succeeding years was 
calculated using the perpetual inventory method. We used the investment deflator in the JIP 2006. 
The sectoral depreciation rate used is also taken from the JIP 2006. 
 
Cost Shares: Labor costs are defined as total salaries and intermediate costs are defined as the sum 
of raw materials, fuel, electricity and subcontracting expenses for consigned production provided in 
the Census of Manufactures, respectively. Capital costs were calculated by multiplying the real net 
capital stock with the user cost of capital. The latter was estimated as follows:   
 















= δ  
 
where  u i pk , , , δ  and z   are the price of investment goods, the interest rate, the depreciation rate, 
the corporate tax rate, and the present value of depreciation deduction on a unit of nominal 
investment, respectively. Data on investment goods prices, interest rates, and corporate tax rates 
were taken from the JIP 2006, the Bank of Japan and the Ministry of Finance Statistics Monthly. The 
depreciation rate for each sector is taken from the JIP 2006. We measure the cost share of each   25
factor by dividing the costs of each factor by total costs, which is the sum of labor costs, 
intermediate input costs, and capital costs. 
  
A2. Treatment of Outliers 
Data for the Analysis of Labor Productivity 
To begin with, we excluded plants that reported either zero employees or a negative number of 
employees, and negative value added. Next, we defined as outliers those plants whose annual 
average labor productivity fell outside four times standard deviations of labor productivity and 
eliminated these plants from our sample. 
 
Data for the Analysis of TFP 
We dropped plants that did not provide information on the book value of tangible fixed asset 
and plants that report zero total salaries and intermediate inputs. We also excluded outliers from our 
sample using the same rule as that applied for labor productivity.   26
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(a) (b)=(c)+(d) (c) (d) (e)=(f)+(g) (f) (g) (h)=(a)-(b)-(e)
1970-75 5.47% 0.24% -0.42% 0.66% 3.59% 2.94% 0.65% 1.64%
1975-80 5.69% 1.35% 0.87% 0.48% 1.98% 2.06% -0.08% 2.37%
1980-85 3.92% 0.81% 0.31% 0.51% 2.12% 1.72% 0.40% 0.98%
1985-90 4.91% 0.68% 0.38% 0.30% 2.46% 1.87% 0.59% 1.77%
1990-95 1.45% -0.01% -0.41% 0.40% 1.41% 1.35% 0.05% 0.04%
1995-2000 1.27% -0.06% -0.42% 0.36% 0.92% 0.79% 0.13% 0.41%
2000-2002 -0.22% -0.98% -1.03% 0.04% 0.37% 0.31% 0.06% 0.39%
1970-80 5.58% 0.78% 0.24% 0.54% 3.17% 2.82% 0.36% 1.63%
1980-90 4.41% 0.75% 0.35% 0.41% 2.24% 1.76% 0.49% 1.42%
1990-2002 1.10% -0.19% -0.51% 0.33% 1.03% 0.94% 0.09% 0.25%
Source: JIP 2006 database. 
Note: The growth accounting at the sector-level was conducted using the divisia index.





















(a) (b) (c)=(d)+(e) (d) (e) (f)=(g)+(h) (g) (h)
(i)=(a)-(b)-
(c)-(f)
Panel A. Manufacturing Sector
1970-75 3.29% 1.75% -0.28% -0.44% 0.16% 0.57% 0.59% -0.02% 1.25%
1975-80 5.11% 3.47% 0.32% 0.19% 0.13% 0.18% 0.16% 0.02% 1.13%
1980-85 4.08% 2.02% 0.36% 0.27% 0.09% 0.45% 0.33% 0.12% 1.25%
1985-90 4.59% 2.90% 0.05% -0.05% 0.11% 0.62% 0.51% 0.11% 1.01%
1990-95 -0.09% -0.30% -0.46% -0.60% 0.14% 0.39% 0.38% 0.01% 0.27%
1995-2000 0.57% 0.00% -0.31% -0.46% 0.16% 0.20% 0.14% 0.05% 0.68%
2000-2002 -2.73% -1.94% -0.73% -0.83% 0.10% -0.03% -0.02% 0.00% -0.03%
1970-80 4.20% 2.67% 0.02% -0.11% 0.14% 0.36% 0.36% 0.00% 1.15%
1980-90 4.33% 2.48% 0.21% 0.11% 0.10% 0.51% 0.40% 0.11% 1.13%
1990-2002 -0.26% -0.45% -0.43% -0.56% 0.13% 0.23% 0.21% 0.03% 0.39%
Panel B. Non-manufacturing Sector
1970-75 4.72% 1.79% 0.42% 0.02% 0.40% 2.42% 1.85% 0.57% 0.09%
1975-80 4.94% 1.92% 0.83% 0.55% 0.28% 1.44% 1.47% -0.03% 0.74%
1980-85 2.98% 1.34% 0.40% 0.06% 0.34% 1.36% 1.12% 0.23% -0.11%
1985-90 4.69% 1.88% 0.49% 0.33% 0.16% 1.52% 1.15% 0.37% 0.80%
1990-95 2.24% 1.31% 0.25% 0.02% 0.22% 0.85% 0.82% 0.03% -0.17%
1995-2000 1.13% 0.45% 0.11% -0.09% 0.20% 0.58% 0.50% 0.08% -0.02%
2000-2002 0.61% 0.38% -0.35% -0.35% 0.00% 0.27% 0.21% 0.06% 0.30%
1970-80 4.83% 1.89% 0.60% 0.28% 0.32% 2.25% 1.90% 0.35% 0.10%
1980-90 3.84% 1.63% 0.45% 0.20% 0.25% 1.39% 1.10% 0.29% 0.37%
1990-2002 1.50% 0.83% 0.09% -0.09% 0.17% 0.63% 0.57% 0.06% -0.04%
Source: JIP 2006 database. 
Note: The growth accounting at the sector-level was conducted using the divisia index.











Office and service industry machines
General industry machinery
Semiconductor devices and integrated
circuits
Electronic data processing machines,
digital and analog computer equipment
and accessories
Miscellaneous iron and steel
Textile products
Eating and drinking places










0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
























































Information services and internet-
based services
Other services for businesses








0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
















































Electronic data processing machines,
















Civil engineering Special industry machinery










Information services and internet-
based services
Telegraph and telephone











0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1















































33Figure 3.1: Start-up and Closure Rate of Establishments: Japan-U.S. Comparison
Both the data for the U.S. and for Japan are based on national employment insurance program statistics.
Sources: New Business Creation Subcommittee, New Growth Policy Committee, Industrial Structure Council (2002).
The original data are taken from Small Business Administration, U.S. Government (1998), Small and Medium Enterprise
Agency, Ministry of Industry, Trade and Industry, Japanese Government (2001), and Study Group on “Industry
Hollowing-out” and Tariff Policy, Ministry of Finance, Japanese Government.
Panel A. Start-up Rate: Japan-US
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a=b+c b c=d+e+f d e f=g+h g h
1981-90 1.81 65.50 34.50 -7.97 15.32 27.15 40.24 -13.09
1990-2003 1.12 48.77 51.23 -3.37 30.72 23.88 53.14 -29.26
1981-85 1.49 74.96 25.04 -19.14 33.62 10.55 32.89 -22.33
1985-90 2.07 70.54 29.46 -11.37 26.52 14.31 28.34 -14.03
1990-95 1.51 67.11 32.89 -15.38 36.82 11.45 28.77 -17.31
1995-2000 1.09 52.19 47.81 -13.05 54.50 6.35 42.72 -36.37
2000-2003 0.90 37.16 62.84 -16.17 86.64 -7.63 87.62 -95.25
1981-90 4.44 75.24 24.76 -0.22 -10.21 35.20 44.44 -9.24
1990-2003 2.41 47.69 52.31 12.39 -0.93 40.85 64.13 -23.27
1981-85 3.65 98.78 1.22 0.31 -17.49 18.39 33.66 -15.27
1985-90 5.39 83.50 16.50 3.56 -11.08 24.01 31.34 -7.33
1990-95 3.75 74.38 25.62 13.63 -10.96 22.95 32.86 -9.91
1995-2000 1.69 74.20 25.80 22.58 -20.06 23.28 55.73 -32.45
2000-2003 1.61 80.95 19.05 69.67 -58.60 7.98 96.42 -88.45
Table 3.1: Productivity Decomposition for the Manufacturing Sector as a Whole
Period
A. TFP Growth
B. Labor Productivity Growth
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37Figure 3.4: Capacity Utilization Rate and Diffusion Index of Business Conditions ("Favorable" minus
"Unfavorable," for Large Firms) in the Manufacturing Sector


















































































































D.I. on large firms (left axis)


















a=b+c+f b c=d+e d e f=g+h gh
Ahn, Kwon, Fukao (2005) South Korea 1990-98 3.51 1.42 0.08 -0.28 0.36 2.01 1.95 0.06
(0.40) (0.02) (-0.08) (0.10) (0.57) (0.56) (0.02)
Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan U.S 1977-87 1.02 0.49 0.27 -0.08 0.35 0.27
(0.48) (0.26) (-0.08) (0.34) (0.26)
1977-82 0.54 -0.05 0.45 -0.18 0.63 0.14
(-0.09) (0.83) (-0.33) (1.16) (0.25)
1982-87 1.46 0.76 0.48 -0.26 0.75 0.20
(0.52) (0.33) (-0.18) (0.51) (0.14)
1987-92 0.66 -0.04 0.47 -0.26 0.73 0.23
(-0.06) (0.71) (-0.39) (1.10) (0.35)
Disney , Haskel, and Heden (2003) U.K. 1980-92 1.06 0.05 0.43 0.16 0.28 0.57
(0.05) (0.41) (0.15) (0.26) (0.54)
1982-87 3.08 1.26 1.48 -0.09 1.57 0.37
(0.41) (0.48) (-0.03) (0.51) (0.12)
This paper Japan 1981-90 1.81 1.18 0.13 -0.14 0.28 0.49 0.73 -0.24
(0.66) (0.07) (-0.08) (0.15) (0.27) (0.40) (-0.13)
1990-2003 1.12 0.55 0.31 -0.04 0.35 0.27 0.60 -0.33
(0.49) (0.28) (-0.03) (0.31) (0.24) (0.53) (-0.29)
Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan U.S. 1977-87 2.13 1.64 -0.13 0.17 -0.30 0.62
(0.77) (0.06) (0.08) (-0.14) (0.29)
1977-82 0.51 0.62 -0.22 0.43 -0.65 0.10
(1.22) (-0.22) (0.85) (-1.27) (0.20)
1982-87 3.73 3.10 -0.07 0.49 -0.56 0.71
(0.83) (0.02) (0.13) (-0.15) (0.19)
1987-92 1.43 1.34 -0.23 0.47 -0.70 0.30
(0.94) (0.16) (0.33) (-0.49) (0.21)
Baldwin and Gu (2003) Canada 1973-79 2.15 1.66 -0.05 1.47 -1.52 0.54 0.24 0.30
(0.77) (0.03) (0.68) (-0.71) (0.25) (0.11) (0.14)
1979-88 1.41 1.44 -0.30 0.23 -0.53 0.28 0.15 0.13
(1.02) (0.22) (0.16) (-0.38) (0.20) (0.11) (0.09)
1988-97 2.91 2.85 -0.37 0.27 -0.64 0.42 0.26 0.17
(0.98) (0.13) (0.09) (-0.22) (0.15) (0.09) (0.06)
This paper Japan 1981-90 4.44 3.34 -0.46 -0.01 -0.45 1.56 1.97 -0.41
(0.75) (-0.10) (-0.002) (-0.10) (0.35) (0.44) (-0.09)
1990-2003 2.41 1.15 0.28 0.30 -0.02 0.98 1.54 -0.56
(0.48) (0.11) (0.12) (-0.01) (0.41) (0.64) (-0.23)
 Table 3.2: Comparison of the Decomposition of Total Factor Productivity for Various Countries
Panel B. Labor Productivity Growth
Notes: The entry and exit effects in this paper and in Ahn, Kwon, and Fukao (2004) include the switch-in and switch-out effects. Values in parentheses







Contribution of each effect
Panel A. TFP Growth
39Figure 4.1: Share of Newly Opened and Closed Establishments in Total Establishments










































































































































































































































































































Top LP group 11,741 5,886 3,376 2,259 1,636 1,230 963 748 619 570 13,086 42,114
2nd LP level group 5,572 6,686 5,119 3,630 2,653 1,823 1,472 1,075 782 615 12,712 42,139
3rd LP level group 3,266 5,039 5,320 4,501 3,479 2,626 1,909 1,458 983 755 12,795 42,131
4th LP level group 2,174 3,533 4,510 4,708 4,207 3,400 2,554 1,802 1,288 887 13,079 42,142
5th LP level group 1,527 2,555 3,458 4,139 4,392 3,975 3,212 2,481 1,708 1,094 13,599 42,140
6th LP level group 1,218 1,808 2,524 3,362 3,894 4,293 3,910 3,264 2,350 1,433 14,080 42,136
7th LP level group 925 1,332 1,888 2,536 3,202 3,888 4,251 4,000 3,256 1,955 14,898 42,131
8th LP level group 706 976 1,331 1,840 2,521 3,258 3,963 4,522 4,279 2,863 15,881 42,140
9th LP level group 541 737 970 1,304 1,688 2,379 3,158 4,391 5,547 4,536 16,882 42,133
Lowest LP group 544 615 793 883 1,167 1,456 2,057 2,990 4,549 7,639 19,468 42,161
13,956 13,028 12,897 13,030 13,362 13,856 14,738 15,464 16,822 19,872 147,025






























Top LP group 8,137 4,472 2,887 1,915 1,399 1,064 852 648 544 511 20,007 42,436
2nd LP level group 3,583 4,508 3,877 3,044 2,317 1,671 1,337 984 691 582 19,854 42,448
3rd LP level group 2,028 3,325 3,571 3,259 2,804 2,256 1,678 1,226 924 708 20,678 42,457
4th LP level group 1,323 2,250 2,808 3,047 2,915 2,515 2,107 1,659 1,256 839 21,735 42,454
5th LP level group 952 1,603 2,097 2,598 2,801 2,683 2,505 1,949 1,491 1,024 22,757 42,460
6th LP level group 737 1,062 1,612 1,986 2,332 2,732 2,684 2,387 1,881 1,201 23,834 42,448
7th LP level group 534 786 1,097 1,534 1,954 2,348 2,629 2,636 2,279 1,590 25,063 42,450
8th LP level group 400 608 787 1,040 1,393 1,913 2,367 2,718 2,793 2,080 26,360 42,459
9th LP level group 333 399 576 729 949 1,242 1,701 2,484 3,034 2,824 28,177 42,448
Lowest LP group 319 348 409 518 588 799 1,028 1,469 2,354 3,626 31,017 42,475
10,255 9,263 8,897 8,953 9,174 9,392 9,728 10,466 11,370 13,654 101,152





















41Sources: Cabinet Office, Annual Report on National Accounts, 2006
RIETI's Database on Japan's Direct Investment Abroad, downloaded from
http://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/database/d02.html#01
on July 15, 2006.












































































































42Source: Data on Japanese firms' production in East Asia is from the JIP 2006.
























-30% -20% -10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40%
Change in Japanese firms'
production in Asia in 1990-
2002/domestic production in 1990
Exit Effect in
1990-2003
43Figure 4.4: Output Share of New Establishments and Establishments
Closing in the Near Future
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44Figure 4.5: Age Effect on TFP by Multi and Single Plant Group
dlnTFP = -0.0004Age

































































1. Base Group is the Plants which were established  in 1981 or earlier and have been operating until 2003.
2. Observations of the plants which were closed before 2003 are not included in the estimations.
45Table 4.3: Survival Rate after Entry
Entry Year 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
1981 and before 100.0% 90.7% 86.0% 81.2% 78.4% 74.2% 70.7% 69.5% 66.1% 65.2% 62.1% 59.5% 57.8% 53.7% 52.8% 49.9% 47.6% 45.6% 42.4% 40.6% 37.4% 34.4% 31.7%
1982 100.0% 79.4% 71.6% 68.5% 62.2% 58.4% 57.4% 53.9% 53.1% 50.2% 47.5% 45.9% 41.9% 41.2% 38.8% 36.6% 34.8% 32.0% 30.4% 27.7% 25.2% 23.0%
1983 100.0% 74.6% 69.9% 59.5% 53.8% 55.4% 49.4% 50.7% 45.7% 42.4% 42.0% 36.8% 37.3% 33.7% 31.5% 30.8% 27.3% 26.3% 23.3% 20.8% 18.8%
1984 100.0% 78.9% 68.7% 63.7% 61.8% 57.7% 57.2% 54.2% 50.5% 48.2% 44.2% 43.2% 40.3% 38.4% 36.4% 33.8% 32.1% 29.2% 26.8% 24.4%
1985 100.0% 71.2% 62.5% 62.7% 56.3% 57.4% 52.1% 48.4% 47.5% 41.9% 42.3% 38.3% 36.1% 35.3% 32.0% 30.6% 27.1% 24.7% 22.5%
1986 100.0% 84.1% 78.0% 72.5% 70.1% 65.7% 61.8% 58.8% 53.5% 52.1% 48.5% 45.9% 43.4% 40.0% 37.9% 34.4% 31.2% 28.4%
1987 100.0% 80.2% 73.7% 70.6% 66.0% 61.5% 57.9% 52.8% 51.5% 48.2% 45.4% 43.0% 39.1% 37.1% 33.7% 30.6% 28.0%
1988 100.0% 70.5% 71.7% 62.7% 56.8% 56.2% 48.3% 49.1% 44.0% 41.0% 39.9% 35.2% 33.9% 29.8% 26.8% 24.1%
1989 100.0% 84.4% 77.5% 71.8% 66.6% 59.2% 57.8% 53.6% 50.4% 47.2% 43.7% 41.2% 37.2% 34.0% 30.8%
1990 100.0% 73.8% 65.5% 63.2% 53.9% 54.4% 49.0% 46.1% 45.4% 40.1% 38.6% 34.0% 30.8% 27.8%
1991 100.0% 82.4% 74.8% 66.2% 64.2% 59.6% 55.7% 52.2% 47.6% 44.9% 40.5% 36.6% 33.3%
1992 100.0% 79.2% 69.8% 67.9% 62.4% 58.2% 54.0% 49.5% 46.8% 42.4% 38.4% 35.4%
1993 100.0% 69.3% 67.9% 59.2% 54.1% 52.6% 46.2% 44.4% 38.7% 34.5% 31.1%
1994 100.0% 79.7% 71.6% 66.2% 61.9% 56.4% 52.7% 47.4% 43.2% 39.1%
1995 100.0% 74.1% 67.2% 63.2% 55.0% 52.2% 45.7% 40.7% 36.5%
1996 100.0% 81.2% 72.9% 65.5% 61.6% 55.5% 49.4% 44.0%
1997 100.0% 79.5% 70.8% 66.5% 59.0% 52.3% 47.1%
1998 100.0% 77.0% 71.8% 62.6% 54.5% 48.1%
1999 100.0% 77.8% 68.2% 58.7% 51.0%
2000 100.0% 64.1% 54.3% 44.7%
2001 100.0% 70.2% 58.8%
2002 100.0% 79.3%
2003 100.0%
46Figure 4.6 Shadow-of-Death Effect on TFP by Multi and Single Plant Group
y = -3E-05x
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47Table 4.4: Ratio of the Average Plant Size of Establishments Set Up in the Same Year to the Industry Average Plant Size: By Start-up Year and by Year of Observation
Entry Year 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
1981 and before 100.0% 111.9% 120.5% 121.4% 128.6% 133.4% 133.6% 138.9% 139.3% 143.2% 146.7% 146.4% 147.6% 146.6% 149.0% 149.1% 150.4% 158.8% 156.2% 158.3% 156.4% 154.8% 159.6%
1982 41.9% 52.3% 56.6% 61.8% 65.2% 66.2% 70.1% 69.6% 71.7% 72.9% 73.8% 75.1% 73.6% 74.2% 74.5% 76.1% 81.8% 81.1% 81.0% 80.5% 83.8% 88.7%
1983 34.0% 42.8% 46.3% 52.9% 54.0% 53.7% 57.2% 57.6% 58.7% 61.3% 62.3% 63.3% 63.0% 66.1% 66.4% 70.1% 72.4% 70.7% 73.7% 75.4% 81.2%
1984 43.9% 60.0% 65.1% 66.1% 77.1% 79.2% 83.8% 84.0% 85.7% 85.1% 85.9% 88.5% 88.2% 88.5% 97.4% 101.2% 99.0% 101.1% 91.4% 98.9%
1985 40.4% 55.9% 61.8% 64.8% 69.3% 73.7% 79.4% 82.8% 85.5% 88.5% 86.5% 89.2% 89.8% 93.6% 97.1% 101.3% 101.3% 97.3% 98.6%
1986 40.5% 46.2% 51.4% 51.9% 56.2% 58.7% 58.5% 59.2% 57.8% 59.3% 60.2% 61.0% 65.4% 64.7% 64.6% 62.8% 62.9% 67.1%
1987 43.4% 57.8% 63.1% 68.9% 70.8% 69.8% 75.1% 75.4% 79.3% 79.9% 80.4% 87.4% 87.3% 89.4% 89.1% 88.5% 95.3%
1988 33.3% 43.6% 46.8% 52.1% 52.2% 54.2% 55.6% 56.2% 59.0% 61.9% 66.3% 68.3% 71.9% 75.4% 78.7% 82.4%
1989 39.9% 52.5% 58.9% 60.8% 68.2% 69.4% 73.4% 77.4% 79.9% 87.8% 84.0% 90.4% 87.1% 95.1% 86.6%
1990 36.0% 49.2% 53.1% 58.0% 61.9% 62.1% 67.4% 66.5% 68.6% 70.7% 72.4% 77.0% 81.3% 88.7%
1991 37.6% 46.4% 52.1% 55.1% 55.4% 59.4% 59.8% 64.6% 65.4% 66.2% 67.2% 68.0% 74.4%
1992 47.1% 52.2% 59.6% 65.4% 61.9% 68.7% 73.2% 80.5% 80.5% 79.2% 84.7% 96.3%
1993 33.8% 45.9% 51.3% 53.8% 55.4% 58.6% 63.0% 67.9% 73.4% 73.8% 78.9%
1994 47.5% 56.5% 60.7% 63.5% 71.8% 71.5% 75.7% 77.8% 85.2% 90.4%
1995 42.1% 56.7% 60.5% 68.9% 71.3% 74.8% 72.5% 70.4% 75.7%
1996 41.1% 49.4% 57.9% 62.6% 70.2% 69.3% 70.0% 79.4%
1997 40.2% 55.6% 57.7% 61.5% 65.0% 67.2% 79.2%
1998 35.0% 40.7% 41.6% 42.4% 42.8% 49.1%
1999 50.1% 61.5% 63.6% 66.9% 74.4%
2000 36.7% 49.7% 55.7% 63.5%
2001 53.0% 69.1% 82.1%
2002 63.1% 84.6%
2003 41.3%
Note: Establishment size is measured by nominal output.
48Table 4.5: Ratio of the Average Plant Size of Establishments Closed in the Same Year to the Industry Average Plant Size: By Closure Year and by Year of Observation
Year of closure 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
1981 36.4%
1982 46.8% 40.5%
1983 67.7% 55.7% 43.2%
1984 53.3% 50.3% 47.1% 40.2%
1985 59.5% 56.3% 50.1% 48.4% 38.4%
1986 58.5% 56.2% 50.9% 49.6% 42.2% 36.8%
1987 60.1% 59.0% 55.7% 49.3% 50.0% 44.6% 39.0%
1988 64.4% 61.6% 58.5% 57.8% 53.3% 45.5% 42.0% 37.0%
1989 73.3% 69.0% 65.2% 62.5% 56.9% 52.2% 49.8% 46.2% 38.0%
1990 55.9% 54.7% 53.8% 52.3% 49.3% 46.8% 44.8% 41.5% 39.7% 32.4%
1991 49.1% 47.2% 46.8% 47.8% 45.6% 44.4% 43.3% 41.8% 40.3% 37.7% 33.0%
1992 62.4% 60.9% 57.5% 54.9% 52.6% 51.5% 48.9% 47.8% 43.7% 41.1% 39.4% 34.2%
1993 68.4% 66.3% 65.0% 62.2% 59.2% 58.5% 56.0% 52.2% 51.2% 49.2% 47.0% 45.3% 37.0%
1994 75.2% 75.3% 69.8% 69.5% 65.6% 64.1% 59.9% 58.3% 56.7% 53.7% 49.4% 49.0% 42.7% 40.0%
1995 76.8% 72.5% 67.8% 65.3% 62.7% 59.4% 56.6% 53.6% 53.4% 51.4% 50.4% 52.0% 44.5% 41.5% 34.2%
1996 80.0% 78.2% 76.2% 71.2% 68.8% 65.5% 62.5% 58.7% 54.9% 57.8% 56.1% 53.0% 53.3% 45.3% 42.2% 36.4%
1997 83.4% 80.6% 79.3% 73.8% 73.3% 68.9% 66.5% 63.7% 60.4% 58.4% 56.3% 56.8% 56.0% 51.2% 47.2% 43.8% 35.9%
1998 89.7% 85.1% 83.4% 82.0% 80.8% 77.4% 74.2% 72.8% 70.6% 69.0% 67.2% 63.1% 59.6% 58.0% 54.0% 52.0% 49.9% 41.1%
1999 124.5% 142.9% 123.1% 117.2% 113.5% 107.7% 101.0% 90.5% 84.4% 79.3% 82.3% 78.6% 67.0% 66.5% 63.4% 58.7% 55.3% 49.1% 42.4%
2000 91.1% 89.3% 86.5% 82.5% 82.2% 78.3% 75.3% 73.6% 71.0% 69.7% 68.7% 65.8% 62.4% 59.8% 58.3% 58.9% 56.1% 52.3% 49.1% 41.2%
2001 114.1% 107.3% 108.4% 107.1% 101.5% 96.4% 95.4% 95.2% 92.9% 93.4% 89.0% 84.6% 81.9% 76.9% 74.5% 70.4% 67.6% 63.8% 60.4% 55.9% 47.0%
2002 143.7% 140.2% 135.1% 134.1% 137.2% 124.5% 118.0% 117.7% 113.8% 110.9% 106.4% 102.5% 101.2% 93.3% 89.9% 84.1% 80.3% 75.4% 68.8% 65.8% 60.3% 51.5%
2003 and after 199.6% 193.2% 194.0% 188.0% 186.0% 178.9% 172.1% 173.1% 167.8% 167.9% 163.3% 157.7% 155.6% 148.3% 146.8% 140.7% 136.8% 135.3% 128.1% 124.7% 117.4% 108.1% 100.0%
Note: Establishment size is measured by nominal output.
49